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THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Greg Goelzhauser*

INTRODUCTION
Breaking Bad1 is a character study depicting Walter White’s transformation from high school chemistry teacher and dedicated family man
to first-rate methamphetamine cook and criminal mastermind. Walt’s terminal lung cancer diagnosis triggers this transformation.2 As Walt segues
from “Mr. Chips to Scarface,”3 the fallout is considerable. Although the
series is driven by its narrative complexity and penetrating character development, law plays an important subsidiary role,4 primarily through the
Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) efforts to track Walt’s criminal exploits. Indeed, DEA Agent Hank Schrader spends much of the series investigating the criminal activities that derive from the production and
distribution of “blue meth,” not knowing his brother-in-law was also the
man he sought called “Heisenberg.”5
Hank ultimately arrests Walt after Walt’s accomplice and former
chemistry student Jesse Pinkman works with Hank to procure Walt’s acknowledged involvement in six potentially death-eligible killings under
federal law during a monitored telephone conversation.6 Had Walt’s busi* Assistant Professor of Political Science at Utah State University. Thanks to
Nicole Vouvalis for watching a lot of television with me.
1. Breaking Bad is a critically acclaimed television series.
2. Breaking Bad: Pilot (AMC television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008).
3. David Segal, The Dark Art of ‘Breaking Bad’, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/magazine/the-dark-art-of-breakingbad.html?pagewanted=all &_r=0 (quoting series creator Vince Gilligan).
4. Law plays an important role in several great television series. See generally
Deadwood (HBO television broadcast 2004–2006); The Sopranos (HBO television
broadcast 1999–2007); The Wire (HBO television broadcast 2002–2008).
5. Hank first briefs the Albuquerque District Office about “the purest [meth]
they’ve ever seen” midway through Season One. Breaking Bad: Cancer Man (AMC
television broadcast Feb. 17, 2008). The meth turned blue after Walt changed the
cooking method in the Season One finale. Breaking Bad: A No-Rough-Stuff-Type
Deal (AMC television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
6. Breaking Bad: To’hajililee (AMC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2013) (speaking
to Jesse in what Walt believes to be a private conversation, Walt says: “Can’t you see I
needed you on my side to kill Gus? I ran over those gang bangers! I killed Emilio and
641
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ness associate Jack Welker (“Jack”) and his white-supremacist gang not
killed Hank and the only other agent who knew about Walt’s arrest
shortly after it occurred, federal law enforcement might have discovered
that Walt actually arranged, ordered, or committed twenty-seven
murders: Emilio Koyama (poisoned),7 Krazy-8 (strangled with a bike
lock),8 two unnamed drug dealers (run over and shot),9 Tyrus Kitt and
Gustavo Fring (bomb explosion),10 two unnamed employees of Gustavo
Fring (shot),11 Mike Ehrmantraut (shot),12 ten prisoners (contract killing),13 Lydia Rodarte-Quayle (poisoned),14 six white-supremacist gang
members (shot by remote-activated gun),15 and Jack (shot).16
What if federal law enforcement had unraveled the mysteries surrounding “blue meth” and sought the death penalty against the characters on Breaking Bad that committed federal death-eligible offenses?
Some of Walt’s murders may be death-eligible offenses under federal
statutes covering murder as part of a continuing criminal enterprise,17
murder-for-hire,18 and murder accompanied by damage to a building used
in interstate commerce.19 Walt could also face the death penalty because
of the volume of meth he produced and distributed, and the amount of
money he earned while he was “in the empire business.”20 And of course
Walt’s offenses comprise only a fraction of those committed by Breaking
Bad’s characters, at least some of which may also be death-eligible under
federal law.21 What makes the counterfactual potentially interesting, how-

Krazy-8!”). Although Hector Salamanca technically killed Gus by detonating a bomb
attached to his own wheelchair, Walt planned the incident, built the bomb, and attached it to Hector’s wheelchair, with Hector’s consent. Breaking Bad: Face Off
(AMC television broadcast Oct. 9, 2011) See also infra Part I (describing how Walt
could face the federal death penalty for his role in Gus’s death).
7. Breaking Bad: Pilot (AMC television broadcast Jan. 20, 2008).
8. Breaking Bad: . . . And the Bag’s in the River (AMC television broadcast Feb.
10, 2008).
9. Breaking Bad: Half Measures (AMC television broadcast June 6, 2010).
10. Breaking Bad: Face Off (AMC television broadcast Oct. 9, 2011).
11. Id.
12. Breaking Bad: Say My Name (AMC television broadcast Aug. 26, 2012).
13. Breaking Bad: Gliding All Over (AMC television broadcast Sept. 2, 2012).
14. Breaking Bad: Felina (AMC television broadcast Sept. 29, 2013).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (2013).
18. Id.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(i) (1970).
20. Breaking Bad: Buyout (AMC television broadcast Aug. 19, 2012); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3591(b)(1) (1994).
21. See infra Part I.
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ever, is not which crimes were committed, but where they were
committed.
On March 18, 2009, just days after viewers watched Walt implement
his “fugue state” alibi after being held captive by former business associate Tuco Salamanca (“Tuco”),22 New Mexico’s then-Governor Bill Richardson signed legislation repealing the state’s death penalty.23 New
Mexico’s lack of a death penalty differentiates it from its five bordering
states.24 Moreover, New Mexico’s lack of a death penalty differentiates it
from California, which is where series creator and show runner Vince Gilligan originally planned to set the series before network executives asked
for a switch to New Mexico in order to take advantage of a tax rebate.25
The decision to set Breaking Bad in New Mexico rather than California,
in conjunction with New Mexico’s subsequent decision to repeal its death
penalty, may have affected the expected punishment its characters could
have faced under federal law.
This Article employs the Breaking Bad counterfactual to motivate a
preliminary empirical analysis of plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases.26 Given the Justice Department’s express commitment to apply-

22. Breaking Bad: Grilled (AMC television broadcast Mar. 15, 2009).
23. Death Penalty Is Repealed in New Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/19/us/19execute.html?_r=0; See LARRY W. KOCH ET AL.,
THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY 50–61 (2012); see generally Marcia
J. Wilson, The Application of the Death Penalty in New Mexico, July 1979 Through
December 2007: An Empirical Analysis, 38 N.M. L. REV. 255 (2008) (providing a comprehensive history of the death penalty in New Mexico).
24. New Mexico borders Arizona, Colorado, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah–all of
which permit capital punishment under state law. The extent to which states actually
seek and carry out death sentences varies. See, e.g., William S. Lofquist, Putting Them
There, Keeping Them There, and Killing Them: An Analysis of State-Level Variations
in Death Penalty Intensity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1505 (2002) (discussing state-level variation in death sentencing). In Colorado, for example, the death penalty has been described as “dormant.” Ginny McKibben, Is State Death Penalty Dead? Judicial System
Impeding the Will of the People, DENVER POST, Mar. 13, 1994, at A01.
25. J.C. Frenan, Interview: Vince Gilligan, SLANT (March 29, 2010), http://www
.slantmagazine.com/features/article/interview-vince-gilligan. In July 2014, a federal
district court judge ruled that California’s death penalty system violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. Chappell,
31 F.Supp.3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014). California is appealing the ruling, but could also
implement changes to satisfy the constitutional infirmities identified by the district
court ruling. In 2012, California voters rejected a ballot measure that would have
repealed the state’s death penalty. James Queally, Support for the death penalty in
California at lowest point in 50 years, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, http://touch
.latimes.com/-section/-1/article/p2p-81359343/.
26. Although the counterfactual can be a useful mechanism for speculating about
causal inference, its limitations are well known. See STEPHEN L. MORGAN & CHRISTO-
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ing the federal death penalty uniformly across states, New Mexico’s lack
of a death penalty should be immaterial in determining whether Walt and
other characters would have faced the federal death penalty.27 Nonetheless, scholars have demonstrated that there is considerable geographic variation in the federal death penalty’s administration.28 Moreover, scholars
have devoted considerable attention to illuminating the “[s]ignificant federalism and state sovereignty issues lurk[ing] beneath the surface of a
nationally uniform federal death penalty.”29
WINSHIP, COUNTERFACTUALS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE: METHODS AND PRINCISOCIAL RESEARCH (2007); see also Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies,
Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517 (2004); Robert N.
Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339 (1992);
Cass R. Sunstein, What if Counterfactuals Never Existed? Studying History with Hypotheticals, NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
119357/altered-pasts-reviewed-cass-r-sunstein. Any empirical insights derived from
this project are motivated by–but do not depend on–the Breaking Bad counterfactual.
27. See infra notes 109–111 (discussing the Justice Department’s uniformity goal).
28. See G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal
Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 425 (2010); see also Rory K. Little, The Future of the
Federal Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529 (2000) [hereinafter Little, Future];
Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1998) [hereinafter Little, History]. See Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters (Most): An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Decision Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009)
(providing an overview of the process); see also Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State
Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 360 (2008); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Judicial Selection and Death Penalty
Decisions, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23 (2014); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical
Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful
Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637
(2014); Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of Reversals
of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004); Greg
Goelzhauser, Prosecutorial Discretion Under Resource Constraints: Budget Allocations and Local Death-Charging Decisions, 96 JUDICATURE 161 (2013); Melinda Gann
Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States,
23 AM. POL. RES. 485 (1995); Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty
and its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227 (2012); Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah,
The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161 (2006).
29. Little, History, supra note 28, at 357. See John Brigham, Unusual Punishment:
The Federal Death Penalty in the United States, 16 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 195 (2004);
see also Michele Martinez Campbell, Federalism and Capital Punishment: New England Stories, 36 VT. L. REV. 81 (2011); Eileen M. Connor, The Undermining Influence of the Federal Death Penalty on Capital Policymaking and Criminal Justice
Administration in the States, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 149 (2010); John
Gleeson, Essay: Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L.
PHER

PLES FOR
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The federalism issues surrounding federal death penalty enforcement in non-death penalty states recently surfaced in Rhode Island.30 In
2010, a federal grand jury in Rhode Island indicted Jason Pleau for robbing and murdering a gas station manager making a bank deposit.31 At
the time of the federal indictment, Pleau was already in state custody for
a parole violation.32 When the federal government moved to have Pleau
extradited into federal custody, Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee
refused given his expectation that the federal government would seek the
death penalty—a punishment that is not authorized in Rhode Island.33
Explaining his refusal to turn Pleau over to federal custody, Governor
Chafee noted that “Rhode Islanders have long opposed the death penalty, even for the most heinous crimes,” adding: “[t]o voluntarily let Mr.
Pleau be exposed to the federal death penalty for a crime committed in
REV. 1697 (2003); Rory K. Little, Good Enough for Government Work: The Tension
Between Uniformity and Differing Regional Values in Administering the Federal Death
Penalty, 14 FED. SENT. R. 7 (2001) [hereinafter Little, Tension]; Rory K. Little, Why a
Federal Death Penalty Moratorium?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791 (2001) [hereinafter Little,
Moratorium]; Sean M. Morton, Comment, Death Isn’t Welcome Here: Evaluating the
Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objection to Capital
Punishment, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1435 (2001); Eric A. Tirschwell & Theodore Hertzberg,
Politics and Prosecution: A Historical Perspective on Shifting Federal Standards for
Pursuing the Death Penalty in Non-Death Penalty States, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 57
(2009); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, When the Federal Death Penalty is “Cruel
and Unusual”, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 819 (2006). There is also an extensive literature
devoted to the normative and public policy consequences of geographic variation
within states in the implementation of state death penalty regimes. See, e.g., Andrew
Ditchfield, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the Application of Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801 (2007); Adam M. Gershowitz, An NTSB for Capital
Punishment, 47 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 151 (2014); Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment: The Case for Eliminating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63
VAND. L. REV. 307 (2010); James S. Liebman & Peter Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2011).
30. In an ongoing case, the federal government is seeking the death penalty
against Boston Marathon bombing suspect Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Polling shows that 33
percent of Massachusetts residents favored the death penalty in that case, while 57
percent favored a life sentence. However, a nationwide poll revealed that 70 percent
of respondents favored the death penalty in that case. Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S.
Weighs Pursuit of Death Penalty for Suspect in Boston Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/24/us/us-weighs-pursuit-of-death-penalty-inboston-bombing.html?_r=0.
31. United States v. Pleau, 680 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012) (en banc).
32. Id.
33. Lincoln D. Chafee, My Pleau Stand Affirms Core R.I. Values, PROVIDENCE
JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 2011, at 6 (explaining reasons for refusing extradition). While in
state custody, Pleau agreed to plead guilty and accept life in (state) prison without
parole.
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Rhode Island would be an abdication of one of my core responsibilities as
governor: defending and upholding the legitimate public-policy choices
made by the people of this state.”34 Subsequently, the First Circuit ordered Rhode Island to deliver Pleau into federal custody.35 Although the
federal government did file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty
against Pleau, it was dropped after Pleau agreed to plead guilty and spend
life in prison without parole.36
This Article advances our understanding of the federal death penalty by offering a preliminary empirical analysis of plea bargaining outcomes in federal death-eligible cases across states with and without their
own death penalty regimes.37 The key result is that authorized federal
capital cases are about 28 percent less likely to be resolved through plea
bargaining when they arise in death penalty states.38 Moreover, this result
is not simply due to variation in public support for the death penalty
across states.39 Accordingly, the answer to the Breaking Bad counterfactual may turn in large part on the series being set in New Mexico rather
than California as originally planned, along with New Mexico’s subsequent decision to repeal the death penalty.40 This result yields important
insight into the political geography of federal death penalty enforcement.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an introduction to the federal death penalty through the lens of Breaking Bad.
Rather than attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the federal
death penalty,41 Part I utilizes factual circumstances surrounding several
of the criminal offenses committed by certain Breaking Bad characters to
illustrate some of the jurisdictional elements that can make crimes death
eligible under federal law. Next, Part II draws from the extensive literature on prosecutorial politics and behavior to unravel the competing theoretical expectations regarding the relationship between state death
penalty regimes and plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases.

34. Id.
35. Pleau, 680 F.3d at 8.
36. Katie Mulvaney, Pleau Enters Guilty Plea in Killing, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL,
Aug. 1, 2013, at 8.
37. Most existing empirical studies of federal death penalty enforcement rely almost exclusively on descriptive statistics. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF
THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM (2000), http://www.justice.gov/dag/surveyfederal-death-penalty-system.
38. See infra Part III(B).
39. Id.
40. As Jesse might say, “Yeah, science!” Breaking Bad: A No-Rough-Stuff-Type
Deal (AMC television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008).
41. See Little, History, supra note 28 (providing a comprehensive history of the
federal death penalty).
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Part III presents a preliminary empirical analysis of plea bargaining outcomes in federal death-eligible cases from 1989 through June 2011, with a
special emphasis on answering key counterfactuals regarding Breaking
Bad. Part III also discusses important data limitations that currently complicate our ability to draw valid inferences from empirical studies of the
federal death penalty.
I. FEDERAL DEATH-ELIGIBLE CRIMES IN BREAKING BAD
The federal death penalty’s modern era began with the Supreme
Court’s landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia.42 In addition to creating
a de facto moratorium on state death penalty regimes, many observers
agreed with Justice Blackmun’s conclusion in dissent that “provisions of
the federal statutory structure that permit the death penalty [were] apparently [also] voided.”43 After the Supreme Court signaled its acceptance of
revised state statutory frameworks in cases such as Gregg v. Georgia44 and
McClesky v. Kemp,45 Congress began an extensive re-implementation of
the federal death penalty.46 Although the exact number of federal deatheligible offenses depends on the counting method employed, the Justice
Department’s Criminal Resource Manual lists fifty “capital eligible statutes.”47 The federal death penalty is so extensive that one commentator
suggested “[t]hat the federal government has the ability to prosecute virtually every homicide in the United States.”48 Some of the crimes Break-

42. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
45. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
46. Members of Congress introduced numerous bills to re-implement the federal
death penalty during the years between Gregg and McClesky. However, most of these
efforts stalled due in part to political gridlock and continuing uncertainty about the
death penalty’s constitutionality. See Little, History, supra note 28, at 372–80.
47. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 71, http://www.justice
.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00071.htm. See also ELIZABETH B.
BAZAN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY STATUTES (2005) (discussing federal death penalty statutes). The Federal Death Penalty
Act of 1994 (“FDPA”) greatly expanded the number of death-eligible offenses under
federal law. See, e.g., RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 974–76 (3rd ed. 2006) (listing the FDPA’s newly-created
death-eligible offenses, the existing offenses made death-eligible under the FDPA,
and the pre-Furman statutes that were resurrected under FDPA); see also George
Kannar, Federalizing Death, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 328 (1996) (noting that “the real
‘federalizing death’ extravaganza” occurred with passage of the FDPA).
48. Connor, supra note 29, at 156. This expansion of the death penalty also raises
potential federalism concerns. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADIC-
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ing Bad depicts offer a useful introduction to the range of federal deatheligible offenses and statutory elements that must be satisfied to invoke
federal jurisdiction.49
A. Death-Eligible Offenses Under the Drug Kingpin Statute
In 1988, Congress took a major step toward re-implementing the
federal death penalty by amending the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
(“CCE”) statute to allow federal prosecutors to seek the death penalty
against certain drug kingpins.50 As the primary law focusing on drug-related killings, the so-called “Drug Kingpin Statute”51 may have played an
important role in prosecuting some of the federal offenses Breaking Bad
depicts. To constitute a “continuing criminal enterprise,” there must be:
a continuing series of violations . . . undertaken . . . in concert
with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person
occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any
other position of management . . . from which such person obtains
substantial income or resources.52

Although the statute’s “complicated structure” may complicate enforcement,53 there is little doubt that methamphetamine distributor and fast
food restaurant chain owner Gustavo Fring (“Gus”) satisfies the various
elements.54

AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 71 (2003) (“[One] problem with a detailed federal code of substantive death penalty law is that it creates tension with the
deference to state and local judgments, which is the emotional center of federalism.”).
49. This is not a comprehensive review of whether various crimes depicted on
Breaking Bad are death-eligible offenses under federal law. Several of the crimes discussed might be prosecuted under more than one statute, and other potential offenses
are not discussed at all. Furthermore, to simplify the discussion I do not consider
potential aggravating or mitigating factors notwithstanding their obvious importance
in determining whether to seek the federal death penalty. See, e.g., Robert Steinbuch,
Reforming Federal Death Penalty Procedures: Four Modest Proposals to Improve the
Administration of the Ultimate Penalty, 40 IND. L. REV. 97 (2007) (discussing the importance of several aggravating factors in seeking the federal death penalty).
50. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181. See Sandra
D. Jordan, Death for Drug Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79 (1991) (discussing the law’s provisions).
51. See U.S. v. Shear, 962 F. 2d 488, 493 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Christopher Q.
Cutler, Death Resurrected: The Reimplementation of the Federal Death Penalty, 23
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1189, 1204 (1999–2000).
52. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (2013).
53. Little, History, supra note 28, at 381 n.187.
54. The “continuing series” requirement has been interpreted to mean at least
three violations. See, e.g., U.S. v. Young, 745 F. 2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]here is
TIONS OF
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Prosecutors may seek the death penalty under the Drug Kingpin
Statute against “any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a
continuing criminal enterprise . . . who intentionally kills . . . an individual . . . .”55 As a result, federal prosecutors could seek the death penalty
against Gus for killing his employee Victor assuming they could demonstrate that Gus was “engaging in or working in furtherance of” a continuing criminal enterprise at the time.56 Although Gus did not explain the
reasons behind Victor’s murder, several plausible explanations suggest
that Gus was “engaging in or working in furtherance of” the continuing
criminal enterprise. First, Gus may have killed Victor because bystanders
spotted him at the scene of Gale Boetticher’s (“Gale”) murder.57 Later,
Walt (who may not have known that Victor was spotted at the scene)
reflects on the incident while taking to Jesse:
I’ve been thinking about Victor. . . . All this time, I was sure that
Gus did what he did to send me a message. Maybe there’s another
reason. Victor trying to cook that batch on his own, taking liberties that weren’t his to take. Maybe he flew too close to the sun—
got his throat cut.58

a consensus of authority that to establish a ‘series’ the government must prove at least
three felony violations.”). The Supreme Court held that a jury must agree on three
specific violations constituting the continuing enterprise. Richardson v. U.S., 526 U.S.
813 (1999). Gus clearly committed at least three felony violations of federal narcotics
law. Gus also clearly held a “management” position. In one episode, for example,
Mike refers to Gus as “boss” and “employer.” Breaking Bad: Half Measures (AMC
television broadcast June 6, 2010). The eleven employees that Lydia Rodarte-Quayle
suggests were involved in Gus’s drug operations seem to satisfy the “in concert with”
provision, but there are many others as well (e.g., Walt, Jesse, Mike, and Lydia).
Breaking Bad: Madrigal (AMC television broadcast July 22, 2012). Lower courts have
held that the supervisor need not have direct contact with each employee. See U.S. v.
Rosenthal, 793 F. 2d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 1986) (“An individual need not have direct
communications with participants in order to be their supervisor.”). As for the substantial income requirement, Walt notes that Gus’s business is big enough to be listed
on NASDAQ. Breaking Bad: Cornered (AMC television broadcast Aug. 21, 2011).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (2006).
56. Breaking Bad: Box Cutter (AMC television broadcast July 7, 2011).
57. Victor mentions upon returning to the lab that he could not “sweep” for evidence because there were “people there,” at which point Mike asks twice whether he
was spotted by these people. Id.
58. Breaking Bad: Hazard Pay (AMC television broadcast July 29, 2012). Although it is clear from the episode’s context that Walt is conveying a message to Jesse
about his frustration with Mike in these comments, it is possible that they also represent a genuine rumination about Gus’s intentions.
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Any of these possibilities satisfy the “engaging in or working in furtherance of” requirement because of the direct connection to Gus’s drug
enterprise.59
In addition to direct killings, the Drug Kingpin Statute allows prosecutors to seek the death penalty against “any person engaging in or working in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise . . . who . . .
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing
of an individual and such killing results.”60 Under this statute, prosecutors
could seek the death penalty against Gus for ordering his employee Mike
Ehrmantraut (“Mike”) to kill cartel hit man Leonel Salamanca (“Leonel”) while in police custody at the hospital,61 or against Walt for counseling or inducing Jesse to murder Gale in order to save his life and
position within the organization.62 Jesse could also face the death penalty
for Gale’s murder under this provision, with prosecutors arguing that the
murder was designed to protect Walt’s position within the organization
and perhaps his own as well.
Walt would probably be considered a kingpin under the CCE statute
for several additional crimes that he committed while not working for
Gus.63 Indeed, Hank may have been referencing the statute when he tells
59. Although each of these plausible explanations are directly related to Gus’s
drug enterprise, lower courts have generally held that at least one motive, among
other possible motives, is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement “as long as
there is a substantive connection between the defendant’s role in the murder . . . and
his participation in the drug [enterprise].” U.S. v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir.
2008).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (2013).
61. See Breaking Bad: I See You (AMC television broadcast May 9, 2010) (depicting that Gus’s order is inferred, albeit not directly observed).
62. Breaking Bad: Full Measure (AMC television broadcast June 13, 2010).
63. It is not clear whether Walt would satisfy the kingpin elements while working
for Gus. The key questions would be whether he acted “in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom [he] occupie[d] a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management.” 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (2013).
Although Walt and Jesse describe themselves as “partners” while working for Gus,
prosecutors may be able to demonstrate that Walt held “a supervisory position” over
Jesse in terms of leading the cooks. While working for Gus, for example, Jesse refers
to Walt as his “boss” during a narcotics anonymous meeting; in the same speech, he
refers to Gus as the “owner.” Breaking Bad: Kafkaesque (AMC television broadcast
May 16, 2010). Walt also supervises Gale and Victor during various cooks. To satisfy
the five-person statutory requirement, prosecutors might argue that Walt supervised
the three laundry employees he once paid to clean lab equipment while Jesse worked
with Mike. Breaking Bad: Cornered (AMC television broadcast Aug. 21, 2011). Although the Supreme Court has noted that the CCE statute was not designed to cover
“lieutenants and foot soldiers,” lower courts have read the statutory language
broadly. Garrett v. U.S., 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985). The First Circuit, for example, has
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fellow DEA agents that “Albuquerque might just have a new kingpin” as
a result of the early investigation into the high-quality (but not yet blue)
meth that was found in Krazy-8’s car.64 When Walt kills Mike in Season
Five, for example, the various CCE elements are clearly satisfied.65 Furthermore, prosecutors could argue that the “engaging in or working in
furtherance of” provision was satisfied by Walt’s desire to secure the list
of names for those jailed individuals who might have had knowledge
about Walt’s involvement in meth production. Prosecutors could also argue that one motive was to keep Mike from conveying information about
Walt to the police, given that Mike quit the criminal enterprise, was
wanted by the police, and planned to leave Albuquerque.
The CCE statute also allows prosecutors to seek the death penalty
against “any person engaging in an offense punishable under section
841(b)(1)(A) . . . who intentionally kills.”66 The referenced section sets
out the criminal penalties for violating a separate statutory provision that
makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally . . . to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance.”67 Section 841(b)(1)(A)
sets different minimums for different controlled substances, with a minimum of fifty grams for meth.68 Although it is not clear how much meth
Walt and Jesse produced in the pilot episode, it was likely more than fifty
grams.69 As a result, Walt could even face the federal death penalty under

held that “[t]he government need not establish that the defendant managed five people at once, that the five acted in concert with each other, [or] that the defendant
exercised the same kind of control over each of the five,” adding: “In essence, the
management element is established by demonstrating the defendant exerted some
type of influence over another individual as exemplified by that individual’s compliance with the defendant’s directions, instructions, or terms.” U.S. v. Possick, 849 F. 2d
332, 335-36 (8th Cir. 1999). It would actually be easier to demonstrate that Mike was a
kingpin under the CCE given that lower courts have held that the statute applies to a
“middleman” as long as the individual supervises at least five other individuals in
some capacity and satisfies the other statutory requirements. U.S. v. Mannino, 635 F.
2d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1980). Characters such as Tuco and Jack may also be kingpins
under the statute.
64. Breaking Bad: Cancer Man (AMC television broadcast Feb. 17, 2008).
65. The “in concert with” provision would be satisfied, for example, by Skyler,
Lydia, and the Vamonos Pest employees.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) (2013).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2013).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2013).
69. Referring to a different batch in episode six of the first season, Jesse tells Walt
that he earned $2,600 ($1,300 for each of them) by selling “about one ounce.” Breaking Bad: Crazy Handful of Nothin’ (AMC television broadcast Mar. 2, 2008). This
statement suggests a market price of about $2,600 per ounce. Earlier in the season,
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the CCE statute for murdering Emilio Koyama (phosphine gas) and
Krazy-8 (strangulation with a bike lock) despite the fact that he had not
yet satisfied statutory requirements such as engaging in a “continuing series of violations . . . in concert with five or more” people.70
As the series progresses, the quantity of meth produced increases
dramatically: in Season One Walt sells Tuco 4.6 pounds;71 in Season Two,
Walt sells Gus thirty-eight pounds;72 and in Season Five, Walt and Jesse
produce 200 pounds per week (fifty pounds per batch) in the Vamanos
Pest-treated houses.73 This is important because federal prosecutors can
seek the death penalty against a kingpin on the basis of the quantity of
the controlled substance involved in the offense or the profit amount—
even if no death resulted from the continuing criminal enterprise.74 Specifically, federal prosecutors can seek the death penalty against “a principal administrator, organizer, or leader” of a “continuing criminal
Jesse gave Walt $4,000 for his share of selling the first batch, suggesting $8,000 in total
sales. Breaking Bad: Cancer Man (AMC television broadcast Feb. 17, 2008). Assuming Jesse did not change the price (Walt does not suggest this until later in the season),
this implies a sale of more than three ounces, which would be more than eighty-five
grams—easily satisfying the statutory minimum. And that does not include the firstbatch samples Jesse provides to Combo and Skinny Pete, or the two grams that the
DEA found in Krazy-8’s car after Jesse provided him a free sample. Id. Although it
was not ultimately mentioned in the pilot episode, the original script suggested that
the first batch would yield one pound of meth. Vince Gilligan, BREAKING BAD 36
(May 27, 2005) (unpublished screenplay), available at http://www.pages.drexel.edu/
~ina22/splaylib/Screenplay-Breaking_Bad-Pilot.pdf.
70. Although Walt and Jesse appear to be working alone at this early stage, Jesse
refers to the “smurfs” (i.e., “the dudes who go to the drug stores and get a couple of
boxes [of over-the-counter products containing pseudoephedrine] at a time and then
sell them to me”) he meets each week while explaining to Walt that the “meth ferry”
will not deliver the pseudoephedrine he needs to fulfill a deal with Tuco. While these
“smurfs” may count toward satisfying the “in concert with” element, it is not clear
how many were employed. Breaking Bad: A No-Rough-Stuff-Type Deal (AMC television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008). Lower courts have held that a supervisor does not have
to communicate directly with the individuals who satisfy the “in concert with” element. U.S. v. Rosenthal, 793 F. 2d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 1986) (“An individual need
not have direct communications with participants in order to be their supervisor.”).
71. Breaking Bad: A No-Rough-Stuff-Type Deal (AMC television broadcast Mar.
9, 2008).
72. Breaking Bad: Mandala (AMC television broadcast May 17, 2009).
73. Breaking Bad: Hazard Pay (AMC television broadcast July 29, 2012).
74. There is some question about whether the death penalty is constitutional for
certain non-homicide crimes following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a state
statute making rape a death-eligible offense. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
See, e.g., Eric Pinkard, The Death Penalty for Drug Kingpins: Constitutional and International Implications, 24 VT. L. REV. 1 (1999); Jeffrey C. Matura, When Will It Stop:
The Use of the Death Penalty for Non-Homicide Crimes, 24 J. LEGIS. 249 (1998).
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enterprise” if the violation involves at least 2,000 grams of meth or if the
gross receipts received during any twelve-month period total more than
$10,000,000.75 Given that 2,000 grams is equivalent to slightly more than
4.4 pounds, the quantity threshold is not particularly high compared to
the volume produced and distributed by the show’s possible kingpins.
Gus, for example, easily satisfied the gross receipts and quantity requirements each week that Walt worked for him.76 If Walt meets the kingpin
elements during his time with Gus, it may be that his crimes satisfy the
quantity requirement but not the gross receipts requirement.77 While
working under Vamonos Pest, however, Walt satisfied both the quantity
and gross receipts requirements.78

75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b)(1) (2013) (requiring “not less than twice the quantity
of controlled substance described in [21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)] or twice the gross receipts
described in [21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B)]”). See also 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(A) (2013)
(mentioning “at least 300 times the quantity of a substance described in subsection
841(b)(1) [5 or more grams of meth]”); 21 U.S.C. § 848(b)(2)(B) (referencing “$10
million dollars in gross receipts during any twelve month period”). But see 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(s) (2013) (establishing a “special provision for methamphetamine” that substitutes 200 for 300 in § 848(b)(2)(A), and five million for ten million in § 848(b)(2)(B)).
76. See Breaking Bad: Kafkaesque (AMC television broadcast May 16, 2010) (depicting Jesse’s estimate that Gus sold blue meth at wholesale for $40,000 per pound,
which would have equaled $8,000,000 per week based on Walt and Jesse’s standard
production of 200 pounds per week).
77. Gus initially paid Walt $3,000,000 for three months, which he in turn split
equally with Jesse. Walt then agreed to an indefinite deal at $15,000,000 per year, but
it is not clear how long he worked for Gus at that rate. Breaking Bad: Kafkaesque
(AMC television broadcast May 16, 2010). By the end of season four, Walt did not
have enough money to pay the estimated $500,000 fee to relocate his family in order
to avoid Gus’s retaliation. Breaking Bad: Crawl Space (AMC television broadcast
Sept. 25, 2011).
78. Jesse said they produced fifty pounds of meth per batch under Vamonos Pest.
Breaking Bad: Hazard Pay (AMC television broadcast July 29, 2012). Assuming they
received about the same $40,000 valuation per pound that Jesse referenced earlier,
that would be $2,000,000 per batch. At one point, Walt, Jesse, and Mike split what
Walt said should have been $1,379,560 from what is presumed to be one batch, after
the dealers were paid. Id. Although it is not clear how many batches Walt cooks under
the Vamonos Pest banner, he claims toward the end of the series that he has
$80,000,000 in cash. Breaking Bad: Ozymandias (AMC television broadcast Sept. 15,
2013). The vast majority of this money is earned within a twelve-month period. Although precise dates are unknown, the methylamine required for increased production and distribution is stolen from the train one episode after Walt turns fifty-one.
Breaking Bad: Fifty-One (AMC television broadcast Aug. 5, 2012). Walt turns fiftytwo in the series finale. Breaking Bad: Felina (AMC television broadcast Sept. 29,
2013).
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B. Death-Eligible Offenses Under Other Federal Statutes
1. Murder of a Federal Officer
In addition to the Drug Kingpin Statute, there are other statutory
options for charging some of Breaking Bad’s characters with death-eligible crimes under federal law. For example, Jack and five members of his
white-supremacist gang open fire on Hank and fellow DEA Agent
Steven Gomez (“Gomie”), resulting in a shootout that leaves Gomie
dead and Hank injured from a gunshot wound to the leg.79 After the
shootout ends, Jack kills Hank with a single bullet to the head.80 Federal
law allows prosecutors to seek the death penalty against anyone who
“kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or
of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including
any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is
engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.”81 The
gang members might argue that Gomie and Hank were not performing
“official duties” at the time, given that Hank’s investigation into Walt
occurred on personal time toward series end. However, Hank had long
led the DEA’s investigation into the production and distribution of blue
meth. Moreover, they had just secured Walt’s confession to several crimes
on a monitored phone call—information that they used to place him
under arrest moments before the shootout. Because Gomie and Hank
were “acting within the scope of what [they were] employed to do,”82 the
“performance of official duties” requirement is likely satisfied.83 As a result, federal prosecutors could seek the death penalty against all six gang
members at the scene.84

79. Breaking Bad: To’hajiilee (AMC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2013).
80. Breaking Bad: Ozymandias (AMC television broadcast Sept. 15, 2013).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2013).
82. See United States v. Heliczer, 373 F.2d 241, 245 (2nd Cir. 1967) (“The test is
whether the agent is acting within that compass or is engaging in a personal frolic of
his own.”).
83. United States v. Street, 66 F.3d 969, 978 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing lower court
interpretations that federal officers act within their official capacity when their actions
“fall within the agency’s overall mission”).
84. Hank screams “police—drop your weapons” prior to the shootout. Jack and
another gang member ask for identification, and Jack adds: “We’ll give ourselves up if
you show us your badges.” Hank and Gomie do not respond, and the gang members
begin shooting shortly thereafter. After the shootout, but before killing Hank, Jack
learns that Hank and Gomie were DEA agents from Gomie’s badge. Breaking Bad:
Ozymandias (AMC television broadcast Sept. 15, 2013). In any event, there is no
statutory requirement that defendants know they are killing or attempting to kill a
federal employee or officer. Cf. U.S. v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 684 (1975) (“We conclude . . . that in order to effectuate the congressional purpose of according maximum
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2. Murder Using a Weapon of Mass Destruction
In the series finale, Walt meets Lydia Rodarte-Quayle (“Lydia”) and
Todd Alquist (“Todd”) in a café, and offers to teach Todd a new way to
cook meth without methylamine in exchange for $1,000,000.85 The meeting and offer, however, were pretense. Knowing where Lydia would sit
and what she would order, Walt laced a package of Stevia with ricin, and
left it as the only package on the table knowing that Lydia would put it in
her tea.86 It is a death-eligible federal offense when death results from the
use of “a weapon of mass destruction,”87 which is defined in part to include “any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector.”88 Ricin
is a toxin under federal law,89 which potentially makes Lydia’s murder a
death eligible offense under this statute.
3. Murder for Hire
Other murders depicted on Breaking Bad provide examples of how
incidental factual issues can be important determinants in whether federal jurisdiction exists over a particular crime. In one episode, for example, Walt meets with Jack and other members of the white-supremacist
gang in a hotel room to arrange killing ten prisoners (Mike’s lawyer and
nine of Gus’s former employees) in order to prevent them from providing
information about Walt to the DEA.90 Under the federal murder-for-hire
statute, a death-eligible offense occurs when a “death results” following
the use of “any facility of interstate . . . commerce, with [the] intent that a
murder be committed . . . as consideration for a promise or agreement to
pay . . . anything of pecuniary value.”91 Assuming meeting in the hotel

protection to federal officers by making prosecution for assaults upon them cognizable in the federal courts, [the statute prohibiting assaults on federal officers] cannot
be construed as embodying an unexpressed requirement that an assailant be aware
that his victim is a federal officer. All the statute requires is an intent to assault, not an
intent to assault a federal officer.”)
85. Breaking Bad: Felina (AMC television broadcast Sept. 29, 2013).
86. See id. See also Breaking Bad: Gliding Over All (AMC television Sept. 2,
2012) (depicting Walt’s initial but not enacted plan to poison Lydia with ricin at that
café if she did not deliver the names of Gus’s former employees who were
imprisoned).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2013).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2)(C) (2013).
89. See, e.g., U.S. v. Leahy, 169 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that ricin is a
toxin under federal law).
90. See Breaking Bad: Gliding Over All (AMC television broadcast Sept. 2, 2012).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2004).
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satisfies the facility of interstate commerce requirement, Walt could face
the federal death penalty under this statute.92
4. Malicious Damages to an Instrument of Interstate Commerce
where Death Results
In Season Four, Walt and Hector conspire to kill Gus with a homemade bomb.93 When Gus visits Hector’s assisted-living facility to confront
him about talking to the DEA, Hector detonates a bomb built and attached to Hector’s wheelchair by Walt, killing himself, Tyrus Kitt, and
Gus.94 The bomb also damaged Hector’s room inside the assisted-living
facility.95 Federal law makes it a death-eligible offense to “maliciously
damage[ ] . . . any building . . . used in interstate or foreign commerce or
in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce” when death results.96 According to the Supreme Court, this provision extends to “all
business property.”97 As a result, the damage to the assisted-living facility
likely provides a jurisdictional hook for federal prosecution.
5. Bank Robbery where Death Results
Although there are many other potentially death-eligible offenses
depicted in Breaking Bad, one more will suffice to further illustrate how a
minor factual issue can trigger federal jurisdiction. In Season Two, two
unnamed individuals steal one ounce of blue meth from Skinny Pete, one

92. The murder-for-hire statute would likely apply even if the hotel was in New
Mexico and all of the meeting’s participants arrived from New Mexico, because the
“intrastate use of interstate facilities” (where “facilities” are equivalent to “instrumentalities”) is sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. U.S. v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310,
317 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (discussing a hotel as an instrumentality of interstate commerce).
In addition to use of the hotel, prosecutors could argue that the cellphone call Walt
received relaying that the killings were completed, or the presumed use of a car to
drive to the hotel, were sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., U.S. v.
Mandel, 647 F. 3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing the intrastate use of a car and use of
a cellphone as jurisdictional triggers under the federal murder-for-hire statute).
93. Breaking Bad: Face Off (AMC television broadcast Oct. 9, 2011); see also
Breaking Bad: End Times (AMC television broadcast Oct. 2, 2011) (depicting Walt’s
failed unilateral attempt to kill Gus by planting a homemade bomb on Gus’s car, and
watching from a nearby rooftop for an opportunity to detonate the bomb).
94. Breaking Bad: Face Off (AMC television broadcast Oct. 9, 2011).
95. Id.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(i) (1970).
97. See Russell v. U.S., 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985) (holding that an apartment building used as rental property was sufficient for satisfying the statutory provision); see
also Jones v. U.S., 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (distinguishing a private residence from commercial property under the Act).
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of Walt and Jesse’s street dealers.98 In the next episode, Skinny Pete informs Jesse that the thieves were a man called “Spooge” and an unnamed
female accomplice referred to as “[Spooge’s] woman.”99 Persuaded by
Walt to recover the lost money and signal that their sellers cannot be
“robbed with impunity,”100 Jesse visits Spooge’s house to demand payment.101 When Jesse arrives at his house, Spooge says he has the money
and shows Jesse a locked automated teller machine (“ATM”) that he and
his accomplice stole from a fruit and vegetable store.102 The store clerk
was killed during the theft.103 Although the ATM looks generic on screen,
Jesse exclaims, “Yo, that’s my bank!” upon seeing it.104 This statement
may be important for determining whether federal jurisdiction is triggered. The federal bank robbery statute makes it a death-eligible offense
when death results from “tak[ing] or carr[ying] away, with intent to steal
or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding
$1,000 belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank.”105 Although the case law is not clear on this point,
theft of a bank-operated ATM from a non-bank location is generally considered sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under the statute, whereas
theft of a non-bank-operated ATM is considered insufficient for triggering federal jurisdiction.106 Assuming Jesse is correct that a particular bank
operated that ATM, rather than it being operated by the store, Spooge
and his accomplice could have faced the federal death penalty for the
clerk’s death.107

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Breaking Bad: Breakage (AMC television broadcast Apr. 5, 2009).
Breaking Bad: Peekaboo (AMC television broadcast Apr. 12, 2009).
Breaking Bad: Breakage (AMC television broadcast Apr. 5, 2009).
Breaking Bad: Peekaboo (AMC television broadcast Apr. 12, 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1948).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 9 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, § 1358, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/
usam/title9/crm01358.htm (making a distinction for federal prosecutors considering
bank robbery charges on the basis of whether the ATM is bank-operated). Compare
Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. Smith, 534 F. 2d 921, 951–952 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that bank-operated customer-bank communication terminals not located on bank
premises are “branches” under the National Bank Act), with Indep. Bankers Ass’n v.
Marine Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 463 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that an ATM owned
and operated by a non-bank company did not constitute a “branch” under the National Bank Act).
107. Spooge seems to confirm Jesse’s recognition of the ATM as being operated by
a particular bank when he replies “it’s FDIC insured, yo.” Breaking Bad: Peekaboo
(AMC television broadcast Apr. 12, 2009). The federal statutory definition of “bank”
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II. THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF PLEA BARGAINING
The counterfactuals regarding federal death charges for crimes depicted in Breaking Bad raise an interesting issue concerning the political
economy of federal death penalty enforcement in light of the fact New
Mexico does not authorize the death penalty. This Part briefly considers
how state-level death penalty regimes may influence plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases. Although the incentives that drive plea
bargaining outcomes are complex, this simplified analysis suggests that
there are conflicting plausible explanations concerning expected plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases across death penalty and nondeath penalty states.108
The Justice Department explicitly favors geographic consistency
with respect to plea bargaining practices in federal capital cases. According to the Death Penalty Protocol, “[a]bsent the authorization of the Attorney General, the United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney
General may not enter into a binding plea agreement that precludes the
United States from seeking the death penalty.”109 A Justice Department
memorandum explaining changes to the Protocol in 2007 noted that this
provision was “intended to ensure that all major decisions affecting the
federal administration of the death penalty are centrally reviewed and
conform to national standards.”110 More generally, the 2007 revision expressed the sentiment that “[n]ational consistency requires treating similar cases similarly, when the only material difference is the location of the
crime.”111 In 2001, however, a Justice Department report suggested that
“geographic ‘disparities’ are neither avoidable nor undesirable,” adding:
“There is nothing illegitimate about a district focusing on the actual needs
of the geographic area for which it is responsible in decisions about the

includes “any institution the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.” 18 U.S.C. 2113(f). If prosecutors could demonstrate that
“[Spooge’s] woman” killed Spooge by crushing his head with the ATM in part to
“avoid apprehension” for the crime (in addition to her anger about the expletive he
repeatedly called her), she could face the death penalty for this act as well. 18 U.S.C.
2113(e). Otherwise, it does not appear to be a death-eligible crime under federal law
to commit murder with a facility of interstate commerce.
108. See Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 475,
484–92 (2013) (discussing the competing incentives structuring plea negotiations).
109. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 106106, at § 9–10.120, http://www.jus
tice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/10mcrm.htm#9-10.120.
110. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Attorney’s
Manual, Death Penalty Protocol Revisions (June 25, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2010/08/17/dag-memo-06252007.pdf.
111. Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 29, at 82 (quoting the 2007 Protocol).

R
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exercise of federal jurisdiction. Rather, a U.S. Attorney who failed to do
so would be derelict in his or her basic responsibilities.”112
The sentiment expressed in the Justice Department’s 2001 report is
consistent with the law and economics literature on plea bargaining. Conceptually, this literature analogizes plea bargaining to contractual negotiations designed to manage risk.113 The prosecution’s incentive to secure a
plea is based in substantial part on its belief about the expected trial outcome.114 Although many factors combine to inform the prosecution’s belief about the expected trial outcome, geography is an important
consideration.115 With respect to the federal death penalty, for example,
scholars and lawyers plausibly assume that the government’s likelihood of
securing a capital conviction will be higher in states that authorize capital
punishment.116 As one scholar noted, it makes sense for federal prosecutors to refrain from seeking the death penalty “when the local cultural
milieu opposes capital punishment.”117 Indeed, one federal judge published an op-ed in the New York Times urging the Justice Department to
adopt “[a] more prudent and realistic approach” to the federal death penalty in part so that the “community’s will” is not “ignored.”118 Another
federal judge noted that “it will be a long time before Georgia [a death
penalty state] becomes just like Vermont [a non-death penalty state],”

112. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEDATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW,
at 17 (June 6, 2001), http://wwwjustice.gov/archive/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy
.htm.
113. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE
L.J. 1969 (1992); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). For a discussion on the limitations of this approach, see
Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464 (2004).
114. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115 (1997); William M. Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
115. See, e.g., Little, Tension, supra note 29, at 9 (“U.S. Attorneys likely attempt to
incorporate the views of their local jury pool when deciding whether and when to
pursue a death penalty.”).
116. See, e.g., Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 29, at 87–94 (discussing perspectives on implementing the federal death penalty in non-death penalty states suggesting that the probability of obtaining a capital conviction in those states is likely to
be lower on average).
117. Little, History, supra note 28, at 469.
118. Frederic Block, A Slow Death, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes
.com/2007/03/15/opinion/15block.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
MENTARY
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adding that any “attempt to achieve uniformity by compelling U.S. Attorneys to seek the death penalty is a bad idea.”119
This emphasis on expected trial outcomes suggests that we may observe more federal capital cases resolved through plea bargaining in
states that do not authorize the death penalty because prosecutors will
expect the probability of securing a death sentence at trial in those states
to be lower on average. However, incorporating the defendant’s plea bargaining position complicates this expectation. As with the prosecution,
the defendant’s incentive to plea bargain is based in substantial part on
the expected trial outcome.120 Like the prosecution, the defendant should
assume that the probability of conviction in a federal capital case is
higher in states that authorize the death penalty. If this incentivizes the
defendant to plea, we may plausibly expect to observe more federal capital cases resolved through plea bargaining in death penalty states. Alternatively, the competing incentives facing the prosecutor and defendant
might cancel each other out such that we observe no difference in plea
bargaining outcomes between death penalty and non-death penalty
states.
Other theoretical approaches to the politics of prosecution generate
equivocal expectations as well. The political economy literature on
prosecutorial behavior commonly begins with the proposition that prosecutors are motivated by a desire to maximize some combination of convictions and sentence severity.121 However, the relative emphasis federal
prosecutors place on securing convictions versus maximizing sentence severity is unclear, and may depend on factors such as how the tradeoff
affects post-tenure employment prospects.122 Prosecutors primarily interested in securing convictions may be more likely to facilitate plea bargains, and this effect might be particularly strong in non-death penalty
states where the expected probability of securing any conviction at a capital trial is assumed to be lower on average. On the other hand, prosecu-

119. See Gleeson, supra note 29, at 1728. See also id. at 1719 (demonstrating that in
addition to being less likely to secure a capital conviction, federal prosecutors may
risk not securing any conviction by moving forward with death charges in non-death
penalty states).
120. Psychological biases and cognitive disorders may disproportionately affect a
defendant’s ability to make a rational calculation about the expected trial outcome.
See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL. L. REV.
652, 664 (1981); Bibas, supra note 113, at 2496–2527; Thaxton, supra note 108, at 490.
121. Landes, supra note 114, at 63–65.
122. See, e.g., JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS (The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978); Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers
of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. ECON. REV. 379 (2005).
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tors primarily interested in maximizing sentence severity may be less
likely to facilitate plea bargains, and this effect might be particularly
strong in death penalty states where the expected probability of securing
any conviction at a capital trial is assumed to be higher on average. But
here again the competing incentives might cancel each other out such that
we observe no difference in plea bargaining outcomes across death penalty and non-death penalty states. This canceling effect might also occur if
prosecutors shift their preference for securing convictions versus more
severe sentences with changes in the expected trial outcome.
Two additional theoretical perspectives on the political economy of
prosecution generate competing predictions with respect to differences in
plea bargaining outcomes across death penalty and non-death penalty
states. First, although it can be a useful simplifying assumption to suggest
that prosecutors are motivated by a desire to maximize some combination of convictions and sentence severity, their motivations are surely
more complex in practice.123 This complexity is illustrated in part by considering how U.S. attorneys secure their positions. Although U.S. attorneys are formally nominated by the president and confirmed by the
Senate, their selection is often driven in practice by the norm of senatorial courtesy.124 Since senatorial courtesy ensures that U.S. attorneys will
typically be drawn from the pool of attorneys in the states they represent,
it is not surprising that they tend to represent local values.125 As a result,

123. See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Political Economy of Prosecution, 5 ANN. REV. SOC. SCI. 135 (2009) (providing a general overview of the political economy literature on prosecution). In addition to maximizing some combination
of convictions and sentence severity, prosecutorial behavior is shaped by the prosecutor’s institutional environment. See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:
THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (Oxford University Press, Inc. 2007);
Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334 (2002); Laurie L. Levenson,
Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553 (1999); Michael J. Nelson, Responsive Justice? Retention
Elections, Prosecutors, and Public Opinion, 2 J. L. COURTS 117 (152); H.W. Perry, Jr.,
United States Attorneys – Whom Shall They Serve, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129
(1998); Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
681 (2009).
124. E.g., Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Executive Governance: Presidential Rhetoric in the “War on Drugs”, 65 J. POL. 995, 998 (“Appointment
usually occurs with Senatorial courtesy and creates a bond between the appointee and
the Senators from the state within which the district lies.”).
125. See Little, Tension, supra note 29, at 9 (“It should not be surprising that U.S.
Attorneys selected [by state-based politicians] reflect, unconsciously and in good
faith, the community values of their community and State.”); see also Alafair S.
Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
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all else equal, this suggests that we may plausibly expect to observe more
federal capital cases being resolved through plea bargaining in non-death
penalty states.
A second relevant theoretical perspective on the politics of prosecution centers on prosecutors leveraging the death penalty to secure a guilty
plea. The Protocol states that “[t]he death penalty may not be sought, and
no attorney for the Government may threaten to seek it, solely for the
purpose of obtaining a more desirable negotiating position.”126 Of course,
this express limitation does not necessarily mean that leveraging does not
occur by design or otherwise. State prosecutors, for example, tend to
deny leveraging the death penalty to secure plea bargains themselves
while simultaneously acknowledging that other prosecutors engage in the
practice.127 Moreover, there is mounting empirical evidence that state
prosecutors leverage the death penalty to secure guilty pleas.128 If this
practice does occur at the federal level, it is likely to be more successful in
states that authorize the death penalty. The reason is that defendants will
presumably perceive a prosecutor’s threat to move forward in pursuit of
the death penalty absent a plea bargain to be more credible in death penalty states, where the expected likelihood of a jury imposing a death sentence at trial is assumed to be higher.
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Data and Measurement
This Part presents an empirical analysis of plea bargaining outcomes
in authorized federal death penalty cases. Data on authorized federal
capital cases are available from the Federal Death Penalty Resource

183 (2007) (describing how prosecutorial “passion,” or how much a prosecutor cares
about a particular case, can influence plea bargaining strategy); Andrew B. Whitford,
Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic Responsiveness: The Case
of the United States Attorneys, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 3 (2002) (providing
a discussion regarding empirical evidence that federal prosecutorial decision making
is influenced by local values in addition to national pressures).
126. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 106, § 9-10.120.
127. Susan Ehrhard, Plea Bargaining and the Death Penalty: An Exploratory Study,
29 JUST. SYS. J. 313 (2008); Susan Ehrhard-Dietzel, The Use of Life and Death as
Tools in Plea Bargaining, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 89 (2012).
128. See, e.g., Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea
Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York’s 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (2006); Nicholas Peterson & Mona Lynch,
Prosecutorial Discretion, Hidden Costs, and the Death Penalty: The Case of Los Angeles County, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 101, 117–121 (2002).
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Counsel.129 The sample analyzed here includes authorized federal capital
cases from 1989 (the start of the modern era) through June 2011. The unit
of analysis is the case. The dependent variable is an indicator variable
scored one if a plea deal was reached and zero if the case proceeded to
trial.130 Out of 313 death-eligible federal cases in the sample, 115 (36.7%)
were resolved through plea agreements.131
The key explanatory variable is an indicator variable scored one if
the judicial proceedings occurred in a state that authorized the death penalty in a particular year and zero otherwise (Death Penalty State). States
that authorized the death penalty for some years in the sample but not
others were scored one during years the death penalty was authorized
and zero during years it was not authorized. Several control variables are
included to account for alternative explanations of plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases. As an initial matter, state-level death penalty support is a potentially confounding factor insofar as it may be
associated both with whether a state has the death penalty and plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases. To capture state-level support
for the death penalty, I utilize estimates generated using multilevel re-

129. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY RESOURCE COUNSEL, http://www.capdefnet.org/
fdprc/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
130. Cases that were awaiting trial are excluded because of the possibility that plea
bargaining could still occur.
131. The conventional wisdom is that ninety percent or more of all criminal cases
are resolved through plea bargaining. See GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 223 (2003) (reporting that
ninety-four percent of federal cases were resolved through plea bargaining in 2001);
Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1979)
(“One statistic dominates any realistic discussion of criminal justice in America today:
roughly ninety percent of the criminal defendants convicted in state and federal
courts plead guilty rather than exercise their right to stand trial before a court or
jury.”); Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 749 (1983) (“It is estimated that over 90 percent of convictions in criminal cases in the United States result from a negotiated plea of guilty.”).
However, it is also well known that plea bargaining rates are lower in capital cases.
One reason for the lower rate is that prosecutors are assumed to offer worse plea
deals in capital cases. Bibas, supra note 113, at 2473 n.28 (“For the most serious
crimes, especially murder, public scrutiny and press coverage pressure prosecutors not
to offer generous plea bargains. Because prosecutors must offer less generous plea
bargains, fewer defendants plead guilty.”). But defendants may also be less likely to
accept plea offers in capital cases. Welsh White, Plea Bargaining in Capital Cases, 20
CRIM. JUST. 38, 43 (2005) (“Persuading the defendant to accept the plea offer [in a
capital case] . . . presents an even more formidable challenge [than securing a plea
offer from the prosecutor].”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\45-2\NMX206.txt

664

unknown

Seq: 24

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

7-MAY-15

14:39

[Vol. 45

gression and post-stratification on state respondents to a national survey
question about support for the death penalty (Death Penalty Support).132
Two sets of variables are included to account for the influence of
legal factors on plea bargaining outcomes.133 First, I include variables capturing the number of murders the defendant is alleged to have committed. Given the distribution of these data, I include three indicator
variables: one for defendants alleged to have committed two murders (2
Murders), one for defendants alleged to have committed three murders (3
Murders), and one for defendants alleged to have committed four or
more murders (4+ Murders). The excluded baseline category is for defendants alleged to have committed one murder. All defendants in the
sample were alleged to have committed at least one murder. Second, I
include three indicator variables capturing the number of aggravating factors said to be present: two aggravating factors (2 Aggravators), three
aggravating factors (3 Aggravators), and four or more aggravating factors
(4+ Aggravators). The excluded baseline category is for one aggravating
factor. All cases in the sample involved at least one alleged aggravating
factor.134

132. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56
AM. J. POL. SCI. 148, 152–53 (2012). As a robustness check, I also fit the model with a
yearly measure of citizen ideology. William D. Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and
Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-1993, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327
(1998). The results are similar. The correlation between death penalty support and
citizen conservatism is r = 0.65.
133. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 713 (1988) (noting the importance case strength in shaping plea bargaining decisions). Each of the personal and case-level variables were
collected from documents compiled by the Federal Death Penalty Resource Counsel.
134. Unfortunately, data on other legal factors that may impact plea bargaining
negotiations such as prior criminal history are not available for the entire sample.
However, many case-level factors are not likely to be correlated with the Death Penalty State indicator. For example, the highest correlation between Death Penalty State
and any of the case-level legal factors included in the model is r = -0.06. As a result,
even though other case-level factors may be associated with the probability of observing a plea bargain, it is unlikely that there is a serious omitted variable bias concern
given the lack of correlation between case-level factors and a state law. See GARY
KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE
RESEARCH 168–76 (1994) (explaining that omitted variable bias arises when the omitted variable is correlated with the independent variables and the dependent variable);
see also Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omitted Variable Bias in
Econometric Research, 22 J. CONFLICT. MGMT & PEACE SCI. 341 (2005) (demonstrating that adding additional control variables may decrease or increase omitted variable
bias assuming that the potential for omitted variable bias cannot be eliminated
entirely).
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The defendant’s race has long been shown to be an important determinant in death penalty enforcement decisions.135 To account for the defendant’s race, I include three indicator variables: a variable scored one if
the defendant is black and zero otherwise (Black Defendant), a variable
scored one if the defendant is Hispanic and zero otherwise (Hispanic Defendant), and a variable scored one if the defendant is nonwhite, but not
black or Hispanic, and zero otherwise (Other Nonwhite Defendant). As a
result, the excluded baseline for comparison in the model is to white defendants. Existing empirical studies have also demonstrated that female
defendants are less likely than male defendants to face the death penalty.136 To account for possible differences in plea bargaining by sex, I
include an indicator variable scored one if the defendant is male and zero
if the defendant is female (Male Defendant). Last, to account for possible
enforcement differences across Democratic and Republican presidential
administrations I include an indicator variable scored one for cases proceeding under a Republican presidential administration and zero for
cases proceeding under a Democratic presidential administration (Republican Administration).137

135. See generally David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the
Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska
Experience (1973-1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002); David C. Baldus et al., Racial
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638
(1998); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Influction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433
(1994); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27
(1984); Raymond Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: The Case of Victim-Based Discrimination, 18 L. & SOC. REV. 437 (1984); Gary
Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783 (1981);
Hans Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981).
136. See Songer & Unah, supra note 28; Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433 (2002);
Victor L. Streib, Rare & Inconsistent: The Death Penalty for Women, 33 FORD. URB.
L.J. 101 (2005). But see Tara N. Richards et al., An Examination of Defendant Sex
Disparity in Capital Sentencing: A Propensity Score Matching Approach, 39 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 681, 681 (2014).
137. See Gleeson, supra note 29 (discussing enforcement differences across administrations); Little, History, supra note 28; Tirschwell & Hertzberg, supra note 29.
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B. Analysis and Results
Given that the dependent variable is binary, I utilize logistic regression to fit the model.138 Table 1 (below) presents results from a logistic
regression analysis on the determinants of plea bargaining in authorized
federal death penalty cases from 1989 through June 2011. The standard
errors are clustered by federal judicial district to account for non-independence within districts.139 Overall, the model fits the data well: 69 percent of cases in the sample are correctly predicted, which corresponds to
a 16 percent reduction in error over simply guessing the modal outcome
of going to trial.
Federal death-eligible cases are less likely to be resolved through
plea bargaining in death penalty states as indicated by the negative and
statistically significant estimated coefficient on the Death Penalty State
variable in Table 1. Moreover, the substantive effect is considerable.
Given that estimated coefficients generated with logistic regression are
difficult to interpret directly, I calculate predicted probabilities holding
state death penalty support at its mean sample value and all binary variables at their modal sample values.140 The predicted probability of observing a plea bargain resolution to a federal capital case is 0.61 [0.27, 0.96] in
non-death penalty states and 0.33 [0.06, 0.61] in death penalty states, a
change of -0.28 [-0.49, -0.07].141 On average, this means that federal defendants charged with death-eligible crimes in death penalty states are
about 28 percent less likely to have their cases resolved through plea bargaining than they would be in non-death penalty states.
Turning to the control variables, the estimated coefficient on the
Hispanic Defendant variable is positive and significant, indicating that
Hispanic defendants are more likely than white defendants on average to

138. See generally ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING
REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 79 (2007) (“Logistic regression is the standard way to model binary outcomes.”); J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION
MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997) (providing
information on logistic regression).
139. See generally David M. Primo et al., Estimating the Impact of State Policies and
Institutions with Mixed-Level Data, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 446 (2007) (discussing clustering standard errors to account for non-independence within categories).
140. J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 2d 157 (2006) (“In general, the estimated parameters from the [binary response model] do not provide directly useful information
for understanding the relationship between the independent variables and the
outcome.”).
141. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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reach a plea agreement in federal capital cases.142 Substantively, the predicted probability of a white defendant striking a plea bargain in a federal
capital case is 0.33 [0.06, 0.60] compared to 0.68 [0.38, 0.99] for a Hispanic
defendant, a change of 0.35 [0.19, 0.51]. Cases proceeding under a Republican presidential administration were less likely to be resolved through
plea bargain as indicated by the negative and statistically significant estimated coefficient on the Republican Administration variable. Substantively, the predicted probability of a plea being struck decreases from 0.70
[0.42, 0.98] in cases proceeding under a Democratic administration to 0.33
[0.06, 0.61] under a Republican administration, a change of -0.37 [-0.48, 0.26]. The remaining explanatory variables were not associated with plea
bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases.
It is important to note that existing data limitations pose substantial
obstacles to drawing confident inferences about the relationship between
state death penalty regimes and plea bargaining outcomes in federal capital cases. Although data limitations such as these exist in nearly every
empirical study, they are perhaps particularly salient in the death penalty
literature due to the subject’s public policy importance.143 As an initial

142. One of the important findings on race and capital punishment is the interactive effect between defendant and victim race—particularly in the case of a nonwhite
defendant and a white victim. See, e.g., Michael L. Radelet, Racial Characteristics and
the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 918 (1981); Isaac Unah, Empirical Analysis of Race and the Process of Capital Punishment in North Carolina, 2011
MICH. ST. L. REV. 609 (2011); Isaac Unah, Choosing Those Who Will Die: The Effect
of Race, Gender, and Law in Prosecutorial Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in Durham, County, North Carolina, 15 MICH. J. OF RACE & L. 135 (2009). To account for
this potential interactive effect, I also fit a model including a variable scored one for
cases involving a white victim and zero otherwise along with interactions between this
variable and the three nonwhite defendant variables. The Other Nonwhite Defendant
x White Victim interaction drops from the model due to quasi-complete separation as
a result of there being no plea bargains in cases where the interaction term is set to
zero. Given that omitting a variable due to quasi-complete separation can result in
specification bias, I also estimated the model using Firth’s penalized likelihood correction. See generally Christopher Zorn, A Solution to Separation in Binary Response
Models, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 157 (2005) (discussing the methodological problems induced by quasi-complete separation in binary response models and the use of Firth’s
penalized likelihood correction). The results were substantively similar. Moving forward, the interplay between defendant and victim race in federal death penalty cases
is an issue that warrants further study.
143. This is perhaps best illustrated by the empirical debate over whether death
penalty enforcement deters murders. See, e.g., Hashem Dezhbakhsh et al., Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel
Data, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 344 (2003); John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses
and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791
(2005); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Capital Punishment and Capital Murder: Market Share
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matter, existing data do not allow researchers to account for the sorting
of potential federal capital cases into the state or federal system.144 Second, the Justice Department does not provide individual-level data on
death-eligible cases that were submitted, but for whatever reason did not
result in a death penalty authorization. Both of these factors raise selection bias concerns. There are additional data limitations for the cases that
are included in this sample. It would be more instructive, for example, to
have information about whether plea deals were proposed by either side
(in those cases that were not resolved through plea bargaining) and, if so,
the terms of these proposals.145 Access to this information would allow
scholars to test more precise plea bargaining theories. Our ability to draw
valid inferences from the empirical results presented here must also be
tempered by an understanding that some potentially important information is not widely available even for the federal capital cases that we observe. Although several case-level factors are included in the models, for
example, there is no systematic information available on potentially relevant considerations such as criminal history, egregiousness, or public salience. Data-availability constraints also make it difficult to analyze
potentially relevant district-level factors such as death penalty support
and preference divergence with Main Justice.
More generally, federal death penalty enforcement is particularly
difficult to study empirically because of its multi-tiered processing structure and lack of publicly-available data regarding decision making at various stages.146 As a result of these data limitations, it is important to be
circumspect about the empirical results presented here. However, it is
also important to continue to push forward with the empirical project of
and the Deterrent Effects of the Death Penalty, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1803 (2006); Lawrence
Katz, Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
318 (2003); Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence Versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment’s Differing Impact Among States, 104 MICH. L. REV. 203 (2005).
144. This potential selection bias exists whenever there is concurrent jurisdiction
between state governments and the federal government. For an attempt to analyze
the sorting of defendants into state or federal criminal justice systems, see Edward L.
Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of
Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. ECON. REV. 259 (2000).
145. See John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the
Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 221 (1977) (noting plea
bargains are “secret covenants secretly arrived at”). See also Albert W. Alschuler,
Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 934 (1983) (referring to plea bargaining as “an
essentially secret system of justice”).
146. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U. S. ATT’Y MAN. 9-10.010 (2014); David J. Novak, Anatomy of a Federal Death Penalty Prosecution: A Primer for Prosecutors, 50
S.C. L. REV. 645 (1988) (providing an overview of the process).
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understanding federal death penalty enforcement. Existing studies of federal death penalty enforcement such as those released by the Justice Department rely almost exclusively on descriptive statistics.147 As a result,
the extent to which scholars and policy makers can draw valid inferences
about enforcement is necessarily limited there as well. Going forward, it
will be important to resolve some of these limitations to further advance
our understanding of federal death penalty enforcement.
C. Application of Analysis to Breaking Bad Counterfactuals
The empirical model’s main result is a general albeit preliminary
one: federal death-eligible cases are less likely on average to result in plea
bargains when they proceed in states that authorize the death penalty.
Although several important factors in plea bargaining outcomes cannot
be incorporated in the empirical model due to a lack of data as noted
previously, we can employ the results to approximate answers to several
Breaking Bad counterfactuals. For example, setting explanatory variables
at their relevant values,148 the repeal of New Mexico’s death penalty during Season Two ultimately increased the predicted probability of Walt entering a plea bargain from 0.32 [0.16, 0.49] to 0.60 [0.37, 0.83], a change of
0.28 [0.07, 0.49]. Regarding the series location change: Walt’s predicted
probability of entering a plea bargain increases from 0.30 [0.12, 0.49] in
California to 0.60 [0.37, 0.83] in New Mexico, a change of 0.30 [0.08,
0.52].149
It is also instructive to compare Walt’s case to Gus’s. Gus was a
Chilean national.150 As a Hispanic defendant, Gus’s predicted probability
of reaching a plea bargain increased from 0.67 [0.50, 0.84] to 0.87 [0.73,
0.99] with repeal of New Mexico’s death penalty, a change of 0.20 [0.06,
0.33]. The switch in series settings from California to New Mexico increased Gus’s predicted probability of reaching a plea bargain from 0.65
[0.47, 0.84] to 0.87 [0.73, 0.99], a change of 0.21 [0.06, 0.37]. In short, accounting for the factors that can be modeled using available data, New
147. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 37.
148. Death Penalty Support was set to its New Mexico-specific value. Furthermore,
rather than hold binary variables at their modal values, I set them to approximate the
state of the world for Walt prior to this death: a white male defendant alleged to have
committed four or more murders with four or more aggravating circumstances in a
case proceeding under a Democratic administration.
149. In this estimate, Death Penalty Support changes from its California-specific
value to its New Mexico-specific value along with the change in Death Penalty State
from zero to one.
150. Breaking Bad: Hermanos (AMC television broadcast Sept. 4, 2011) (depicting
a conversation between Hank and Gus where Hank says, “I know you’re a Chilean
national.”).
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Mexico’s death penalty abolition, and switching series settings from California to New Mexico, increased Gus’s expected probability of reaching a
plea deal about ten percent less than it increased Walt’s expected
probability of reaching a plea deal, although Gus’s baseline predicted
probability of reaching a plea deal was considerably higher.
CONCLUSION
Although Breaking Bad will be remembered for its nuanced storytelling far more than its foray into the intricacies of federal criminal law,
the unlawful activities depicted in the series, combined with the decision
to switch series settings from California to New Mexico, and New Mexico’s subsequent decision to repeal the death penalty, motivate an important but unanswered real-world policy question: does a state’s death
penalty regime influence federal death penalty enforcement? The preliminary empirical analysis presented here suggests that federal death-eligible cases are less likely to be resolved through plea bargaining when they
arise in death penalty states. Ultimately, while this result may not matter
for our understanding of Breaking Bad, it does have important real-world
federalism implications and helps to build an empirical foundation for the
broader scholarly and public policy debate concerning federal death penalty enforcement. In addition to resolving the existing data limitations
discussed previously, future work on this subject should analyze whether
other outcomes in federal capital cases—such as the imposition of a death
sentence—are also impacted by the state’s death penalty regime.
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Table 1: Logistic Regression Analysis of Plea Bargaining Outcomes
in Federal Capital Cases

Death Penalty State
Death Penalty Support
Black Defendant
Hispanic Defendant
Other Nonwhite Defendant
Male Defendant
2 Murders
3 Murders
4+ Murders
2 Aggravators
3 Aggravators
4+ Aggravators
Republican Administration
Intercept

Estimated Coefficient
(Standard Error)
-1.16*
(0.45)
0.02
(0.03)
0.11*
(0.37)
1.46*
(0.39)
0.83
(0.86)
0.12
(0.90)
-0.11
(0.51)
0.13
(0.50)
-0.58
(0.35)
-1.04
(0.68)
-0.84
(0.61)
-1.02
(0.62)
-1.55*
(0.27)
0.54
(2.57)

Observations
313
* p < .05 (two-tailed). Standard errors clustered by district.
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